We study the effect of employer prominence on entrepreneurial transition of employees. We highlight two mechanisms that lead to high rate of departure from prominent firms to entrepreneurship: sorting and influence. Sorting refers to the systematic selection of high ability employees to prominent firms whereas influence refers to the added value of being employed in the prominent firm in terms of learning. Our empirical results using an employer-employee matched dataset from Sweden confirm our hypothesis. Employees are more likely to leave prominent firms to entrepreneurship. Learning knowledge and skills seems to be more important for transition to entrepreneurship than sorting.
INTRODUCTION
Employees of incumbent firms often leave their employers (spin-out) to establish their own organizations. Although in general entrepreneurship is a relatively rare phenomenon 1 , employee entrepreneurship is remarkably widespread in a variety of industries such as semiconductors (Braun and Mcdonald, 1978; Brittain and Freeman, 1986) , disk drives (Christensen, 1993; Agarwal et al., 2004) , lasers (klepper and Sleeper, 2005) , biotechnology (Mitton, 1990; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003) , medical devices (Chatterji, 2009) , automobiles (Klepper, 2007) , and professional services (Campbell et al. 2011 , Carnahan, Agarwal, & Franco, 2011 . A stylized fact common to the employee entrepreneurship literature attributes a significant premium to being in the employ of the leading firms in the industry (Klepper, 2007; Gompers, Lerner, & Scharfstein, 2005; Agarwal et al., 2004; Romanelli, 1989) or in general prominent firms (Burton, Sorensen, & Beckman, 2002) . Employees of prominent firms seem to be more likely to transition to entrepreneurship than employees of less prominent firms (Klepper, 2007; Burton, Sorensen, & Beckman, 2002) . In other words prominent firms spin-out more entrepreneurial ventures than others. Although extant literature generally acknowledges the greater numbers of spin-outs emerging from prominent firms, with a few exceptions (Burton, Sorensen, & Beckman, 2002 ) the cause and consequences of incumbent prominence on employee entrepreneurship has remained largely unexplored. This paper makes an effort to address this gap.
In this paper we intend to systematically analyze the prominent firm effect on employee entrepreneurship and investigate its antecedents. In particular we juxtapose two alternative explanations with respect to prominent firm effect, sorting and influence, both of which may explain why employees frequently leave prominent incumbents to entrepreneurship. Sorting refers to the ex-ante matching of best and brightest employees with prominent firms much like the classic assortative matching in the marriage market (Becker,1973) , however applied to the labor market. Sorting therefore emphasizes pre-dispositional characteristics of individuals as the determinant of entrepreneurship. Influence, instead, refers to the effect of context and the value added by the prominent firm. In other words influence implies that by being in the employ of a prominent firm, employees learn valuable knowledge about the industry and get access to better entrepreneurial opportunities. Our results show that indeed employees are more likely to transition to entrepreneurship from prominent firms. The effect prominence appears positive and significantly related to transition to entrepreneurship. Both sorting and influence explain transition to entrepreneurship albeit with different intensity. Being in the employ of a prominent firm significantly reduces the inter-firm mobility of employees but if they move they are more likely to transition to entrepreneurship instead of joining another incumbent.
Findings of this research have several contributions. First, by examining employee entrepreneurship from the lens of influence and sorting we delve into the micro-foundations of strategy by unpacking the process that leads to employee entrepreneurship from prominent firms.
Understanding this particular entrepreneurship process goes to the center of the debate in strategy about the sources of the capabilities of new firms. Second, current emphasis of the theory of entrepreneurial spawning is on the learning and knowledge inheritance. Learning theories highlight that employees of incumbent firms, especially prominent ones, learn valuable knowledge about the industry, gain superior access to their parent firms' resources, obtain access to financial networks, and identify opportunities better and in a timely manner. Therefore employees' probability of departing and starting their own firm is shaped by learning various kinds of knowledge at the parent firm. Nevertheless, learning theories neglect sorting effects of the labor market. Sorting argument thus reflects dispostional characteristics of employees that are correlated with their choice of an employer and their subsequent decision to engage in entrepreneurship. Evaluating the magnitude of learning and sorting will inform which mechanism contributes more to entrepreneurial spawning and how these two mechanisms may combine together to create synergies. Third, findings of this research have implications for employing firms as well. If sorting proves to be the dominant mechanism in entrepreneurial spawning, then parent firms can use variety of practices to retain their best employees that they hire. For instance, such employees may value non-pecuniary benefits more than monetary incentives. If learning mechanism predicts entrepreneurial spawning more than sorting, then parent firms should be aware that their knowledge will spill over through the mobility of employees. And that their routines and procedures that were deeply embedded in their employees through repeated and long term exposure are likely to be replicated by them in their new venture (Wezel, Cattani, and Pennings, 2006) . Therefore departure of these employees will act as a double edge sward harming the parent firm not only through loosing the talent but also through threats of knowledge leakage and replication of routines.
In the reminder of this article, we will first review the literature in employee entrepreneurship, define the gap in the current stream of research, and highlight the importance of the mobility of individuals in the labor market that in some instance will transcend into systematic sorting patterns. Next we will move on to elaborate on the theory. we will then present the data and methodology to test the predictions of the theory. Immediately after the data description and methodology we will present the results and finally conclude with a discussion and conclusion.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Entrepreneurship by ex-employees of incumbent firms has been the subject of research in strategy, economics, and organizational sociology. Prior work shows that there is considerable heterogeneity in the rate of spin-out generation among incumbent firms. Some firms are simply more fertile than others. A classic example of such a fertile firm in early days of semiconductor industry is Fairchild with 24 spin-outs among which Intel, National Semiconductor, and
Advanced Micro Devices are notable ones (Klepper, 2007; Brittain & Freeman, 1986) .
Furthermore, Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2005) Theoretical and empirical work in prior literature highlights several characteristics of incumbent firms that are related to their spawning intensity. For example, Agarwal et al. (2004) emphasize information advantages that are accrued to employees of pioneering firms in the industry. As Stinchcombe (1965) (Lazear, 2005) .
In a similar fashion, Elfenbein, Hamilton, and Zenger (2010) argue that both context and individual traits operate simultaneously in a way that makes some firms more fertile in entrepreneurial spawning than others. Their empirical paper shows that the high rate of spin-outs from small firms compared to large firms is because labor market sorts individuals with entrepreneurial inclination to work environment offered in small firms and that small firms bestow varied skills and access to a wide network of contacts with customers, suppliers, and resource providers.
Although these literatures inform us about various specific characteristics of incumbent firms that may affect the intensity of spin-out generation, except for Elfenbein, Hamilton, and Zenger (2005) and Burton, Sorensen, and Beckman (2002) , none correspond precisely to the structural position of an incumbent firm among other established firms on which recruitment and entrepreneurial mobility of employees are integrated. In fact individuals make conscious decisions about their choice of an employer for advancement in paid employment well before departing for entrepreneurship just as firms decide who to recruit. Therefore we believe that any study that attempts to precisely understand why employees leave some incumbents more often to entrepreneurship should also integrate why those employees chose to work for those incumbents in the first place and which job market candidates are selected to work for those incumbents. In particular we argue that prominent firms, those that are highly productive, are more likely to generate spin-outs for two reasons: first, prominent firms add more value to their employees in terms of learning valuable industry knowledge and access to networks of customers and resource providers, second, labor market matching sorts best and brightest employees, who are likely to maximize their career advancement rewards via entrepreneurship, in prominent firms.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS
Inheritance of knowledge from parent firm is probably the most compelling theory that prior literature has attributed to spin-out generation. The origin of knowledge inheritance as a theory is traced back to models and metaphors from biological evolution. Biological models of evolution are increasingly being used in analysis of organizations (Aldrich, 1999) , business strategy (Barnett and Burgelman 1996) , and economic models of industrial competition (Nelson and Winter, 1982) . Apart from variation and selection which are fundamental concepts in theories of biological evolution and have occupied much space in models of industrial competition, another important element of biological theories of evolution is heredity which involves reproduction and transmission of genes to offspring (Nelson, 1995; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005) . In recent studies heredity is used to explain the sources of knowledge and capabilities of spin-out firms as well as their performance outcomes (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005;  the spin-out firm through mobility of employees from parent to progeny, where knowledge is thought of as the industrial counterpart of genes.
Above statements delineate general advantages of being employed in an incumbent firm.
Nevertheless, as said before incumbent firms differ in several dimensions like innovativeness, network of resources and structural position in the competitive market (e.g. size, age) as described by economic sociologists (Burton, Sorensen, Beckman, 2002; Phillips, 2002) .
Therefore it is not hard to conceive that employees' knowledge and abilities to succeed in an industry is largely shaped by the knowledge, capabilities, and resources of their employer (Klepper and Simons, 2000) . In fact Stinchcombe (1965) notes that pre-founding conditions imprint an organization along various dimensions including technology, routines, strategy, and structure. We focus on one of the structural dimensions of firms that capture their prominence namely their productivity 2 . Productivity refers to the amount of value that a firm can generate with a given stock of resources. Highly productive firms are likely to be the ones that have developed superior routines and procedures that allow them to generate greater output from their given set of resources. Superior routines and abilities of highly productive firms will also affect customers' willingness to pay for their services. Their superior knowledge base and their ability to absorb and assimilate external knowledge in order to create new knowledge will probably create an environment that allow their employees to imbibe greater knowledge about the industry (Agarwal et al. 2004) , learn knowledge generation routines, and obtain better access to resources (Burton, Sorensen, Beckman, 2002) and entrepreneurial opportunities. It should be noted that conceiving the prominent firm as a superior learning environment allows us to relax the assumption that entrepreneurial opportunities are equally distributed among firms. Relaxing the assumption of arrival of homogenous entrepreneurial opportunities therefore means that prominent firms provide greater access to entrepreneurial opportunities to their employees and knowledge required to succeed in entrepreneurship. Being employed in a prominent firm increases both the quality and quantity component of learning and resources that an employee can inherit. Nevertheless just as collective learning where accumulation of collective mind-sets and shared understanding of routines and procedures unfold and become shaped overtime (Wezel, Cattani, & Pennings, 2006) , learning about firm's routines and knowledge about procedural and functional capabilities is subject to time compression diseconomies as well. In other words, although prominent firms have developed superior routines and capabilities, effective learning of those routines and capabilities requires repeated interaction and exposure of actors to those routines. In addition, routines and capabilities that make a firm more prominent among other group of firms are likely to be more complex that can only be replicated if they are well absorbed and learned by actors exposed to them. Once the knowledge about routines and capabilities are imbibed by actors, they may use that knowledge to exploit opportunities for advancement. Employees of prominent firms therefore are at a risk set of exposure to valuable routines and knowledge about the industry, however, effective assimilation of such knowledge require repeated exposure. Hence the influence of prominent firm on its employees will unfold over time and by the duration of time that individuals are in the employ of that firm.
As a result, the likelihood of spinning-out is affected by the added value of being employed in a more prominent firm. The above arguments suggest that prominent parent firms enhance the skills and knowledge of their employees more than less prominent parent firms.
Also prominent parent firms may be disproportionately more endowed with entrepreneurial opportunities than less prominent firms. All together the added value of being employed in a prominent parent firm will result in greater likelihood of spinning out. Therefore we hypothesize: There are several reasons to expect that high ability employees with strong preferences for maximizing their rewards are likely to be employed in prominent firms before departing for entrepreneurship where the reward to their ability riches its peak. Highly productive and prominent firms have greater knowledge assets and their productive output per resource input is considerably more than other firms. Such productive firms may obtain greater visibility not only among outside evaluators, customers, and investors but also among prospective employees.
Therefore it should be natural to assume that job market candidates will be aware of qualities of firms and will be able to distinguish prominent firms from less prominent ones. Although we don't argue that prominence of firms completely eliminates friction in the labor market but the assumption that prominence and visibility of firms increases efficiency in labor market matching seems to hold in a modern economy where many firms operate alongside each other and search costs can be markedly reduced to enable fine grained sorting (wheeler, 2001) . As a result we assume that availability of differentiated firms along the dimension of productivity enhances efficiency in labor market matching.
Although the above argument gives a slight hint about the increase in the efficiency of labor market, it doesn't say much about why prominent firms are more likely to obtain highly able employees from the labor market and why employees prefer to work for innovative firms.
We present a stylized analysis of the sorting process under two conditions: the first is when there is no complementary in the skill of a prospective employee and the skills of the prominent firm's workforce to achieve a particular output and the second is when this assumption is relaxed and skills of employees become complementary to each other. We show that under both scenarios best employees are likely to be matched with prominent firms.
Employer-employee match without skill complementarities
The employer-employee matching process without skill complementarities refers to the situation where the recruitment decision of an employee does not depend on the skill composition of the employer's workforce. In other words, it is assumed that the contribution of each employee on the production output of the firm is independent from each other and employees are paid according to their own marginal productivity. This matching process thus resembles the type of the matches observed in college admission process (Gale and Shapley, 1962) or in the market for financial resources where venture capital firms match with entrepreneurial firms (Sorensen 2007) . With this matching logic at equilibrium the best is matched with the best and the worst is matched with the worst. Gale and Shapley (1962) illustrate this matching process with the college admission model. Extending Gale and Shapley's (1962) matching process to the labor market, the employer-employee matching process resembles to that of college admission model for it is a one-to-many matching model. Each firm can match with several employees, but each employee can only match with a single firm at each point in time. Employees rank firms according to a preference dimension (prominence) and employers rank employees based on their abilities. The result of the matching process will be that prominent firms are matched with high ability employees and less able employees are pushed down to match with less prominent firms. If entrepreneurial opportunities arrive at a constant rate to both prominent and less prominent firms, and assuming that exploitation of those opportunities requires combination of the individual knowledge with information about those opportunities (Shane 2000) then it is easily observed that more prominent firms will spawn more entrepreneurial ventures simply because they are stocked with employees with greater human capital. In other words since employees of prominent firms possess greater human capital they are more likely to recognize outside entrepreneurial opportunities than employees of less prominent firms.
Employer-employee match with skill complementarities
In this scenario we assume that an employee's productivity in and on itself doesn't determine the output of the firm and the returns to the employee but the value of the skill of an employee manifests through the efforts and skills of other employees. In other words skills of employees complement each other. This type of production process is well illustrated in Kremer (1993) and Kremer and Maskin (1996) . In fact it is not hard to believe that production process in firms is done by several employees collaborating with each other and each undertakes several interdependent tasks and that the output depends on the "weakest link."
In the matching scenario with skill complementarities there is positive incentive for both employees and employers to form an assortative matching (Becker, 1973) . When there are complementarities in skills, the marginal productivity of an employee stays positive with respect to the skill level of the other employees. As result firms that have employees of high ability benefit more by creating a near homogenous workforce (Kremer, 1993) . Highly productive firms therefore place the highest bid for employees of high abilities and in equilibrium like in Becker's (1973) marriage model workers of the same skills will be matched together. Since the increase in the output of a firm reflects higher wages as well it follows that high ability workers will be paid higher wages if they are employed in firms that appreciate their level of skill.
Overall above arguments suggest that high ability employees are more likely to be matched with prominent firms and since these employees are compensated according to their marginal productivity it is likely that advancement opportunities for them through wage employment in other firms is severely limited (Sorensen and Sharkey, 2011) , and therefore they will select into entrepreneurship when the opportunity arises. As a result we shall observe more entrepreneurial transition of high ability employees from prominent firms.
H3: high ability employees are more likely to be employed in prominent firms.
H4: high ability employees are more likely to transition to entrepreneurship from prominent firms.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data for this analysis comes from a special extract (professional service firms) from two matched longitudinal data sources. The first is the longitudinal integrated database for medical Therefore our final sample for analysis ranges from 1997 to 2008.
The focus on professional service firms which include firms active in legal service industries, accounting and tax consultancy, and business and management consultancy is for several reasons. First professional services industries typically have low barriers to mobility and exclude non-compete clauses (Carnahan, Agarwal, & Campbell, 2011) and rates of entrepreneurship are relatively high. Second professional service industries are extremely human capital intensive and productivity of the firms depends highly on the quality and ability of their workforce. Hence recruitment in these sectors resembles a lot to college admission models where employers and employees rank their preferences based on prominence and ability, respectively.
Third, prominence of firms in the professional service industries is likely to be reflected with their productivity and the amount that customers are willing to pay for their services. Earlier research suggests that the amount of money that an agent is willing to forgo to acquire the services of a firm indicates the prominence of that firm (Sorensen, 2007) .
Measures
Firm Prominence. We define firm prominence by its productivity. Productivity refers to the value generated from a given set of inputs. In the professional service industries productivity is directly related to the contribution of human assets and is reflected in the customers' willingness to pay for the services of those firms. We calculate productivity by revenue minus costs divided by the number of employees. Therefore productivity with this calculation specifies the value of the firm's output generated per employee.
Employee mobility. To test the effect of firm prominence on mobility of employees we create the dependent variable employee mobility which is coded 1 if the employee had changed the employer since previous year and 0 otherwise.
Entrepreneurial mobility.
To test the effect of firm prominence on the likelihood of employees departing to entrepreneurship and to see the transition of high ability employees to entrepreneurship from prominent firms, we create the entrepreneurial mobility variable that takes the value of 1 if the employee had changed the employer since the last year and became the founder or owner of the new firm and 0 otherwise.
Tenure.
To test the effect of exposure to routines and knowledge at the incumbent firm and in general the influence of the parent firm on employee entrepreneurship we use tenure at the parent firm.
High and low ability employees. Prior work documents high correlation between individual performance and earnings (Parsons, 1977) . Hence exploit the compensation data to identify employee ability. We identified high and low ability employees using their own industry as referents. Following Carnahan et al. (2011) we employ a wage residual approach in identifying high and low ability employees of the industry. Therefore we identify high and low ability employees as those individuals belonging to the top 10 percent and bottom 10 percent of the residual of the following wage equation:
Where is the income of individual in year t. is the vector of individual characteristics including demographic variables, tenure, and educational level. is a vector of firm level characteristics including size (number of employees), age, revenue, productivity, total financial investments, number of establishments, number of different industries that a firm is active in.
, , are dummy variables capturing the municipality of the employee's firm, the main industry of the firm, and the year of observation respectively.
Empirical strategy
We test our hypothesis using both linear probability models and conditional logit models.
In the linear probability model we included firm-year fixed effects to absorb any unobserved variation that is constant within firm-years. We present our results both for mobility to an existing incumbent and entrepreneurial mobility conditional on mobility. As noted earlier our final sample form analysis is consisting of an 11 year panel starting from 1997. To account for non-random sample attrition in our data, we limited the analysis to individuals who were between the ages of 20 to 50 in 1997. By limiting the sample to these ages we are minimizing the risk of losing individuals early on in our sample due retirement for instance. In addition, in order to have a homogenous risk set among individuals we limited our analysis to those individuals who were new employees on incumbent firms in 1997. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics on sample means for the variables used in our study. Mobility in our sample is nearly 10 percent with approximately 1 percent transition to entrepreneurship rather than staying with their employer or moving to another firm. Average age in our sample is around 1 with near equal representation of men and women. Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for our entire sample. Table 1 and 2 about here Table 3 reports the result of linear probably model and logit regression on employee mobility. The results of this table serve as a base line to investigate the general departure of employees from prominent firms. The relationship of control variables is consistent with the turnover literature. High ability employees, those that are at the top 10 percent of the wage residual distribution, are less likely to exit firms. On the contrary, low ability employees, those that are at the top 10 percent of the wage residual distribution, are more likely to exit firms.
----------------------------
-----------------------------
RESULTS
Prominence of incumbent firms, measured by their productivity, has a significant and negative relationship with employee mobility implying that employees are less likely to leave prominent employers. When ability of employees are interacted with the prominence of their employer, the logit model shows that low ability employees are significantly less likely to leave prominent firms possibly because they receive greater rewards in excess of their contribution to the output of their firm. High ability employees on the other hand seem to have no difference in rates of departure from prominent firms. Table 3 about here Table 4 reports the tests of our hypothesis about employee entrepreneurship. Again the result of linear probability model is reported alongside the conditional logit model. Estimation is limited to the sample of employees who left the incumbent firms to found their own venture or became the owner of a new venture. Hypothesis 1 stated that employees of prominent incumbent firms are more likely to transition to entrepreneurship. In fact, the coefficient of firm prominence is positive and significant which supports our hypothesis. Note that the effect of prominence with respect to employee mobility was negative and significant however, conditional on mobility having a prominent parent increases the likelihood of entrepreneurship. This result therefore confirms earlier speculations of the literature that prominent firms are more likely to generate spin-outs. Hypothesis 2 indicated that exposure to knowledge and routines of prominent firms increase the likelihood of mobility to entrepreneurship. We tested hypothesis 2 by interacting duration of tenure at the parent firm with the prominence (productivity) of the parent firm. First note that the main effect of tenure on employee entrepreneurship is negative and significant in the logit model. The result of the interaction of employee tenure and parent firm prominence is positive and significant in the conditional logit model. This result therefore provides strong support for our hypothesis. Prominent firms influence the knowledge and capabilities of their employees. This finding is consistent with the earlier literature suggesting that employees learn valuable knowledge about the industry and gain superior skills and capabilities at prominent firms.
---------------------------- Table 4 about here
Returning to hypothesis regarding the sorting argument, hypothesis 4 stated that high ability employees are more likely to transition to entrepreneurship from prominent firm because the opportunities for advancement reaches its peak in entrepreneurship. the employee is considered as high ability in its respective industry has no effect on its employer being a prominent firm in that industry. Therefore hypothesis 3 stating that high ability employees will be in the employ of prominent firms is rejected. Table 5 about here
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The analysis in the previous section aimed at understanding three issues pertaining to the effect of parent firm prominence on employee entrepreneurship and its route causes. Clearly prominent firms, those that have higher productivity compared to their counterparts, have higher rates of spin-out generation. Employees are more likely to leave prominent firms to start their own business. This result is shown alongside the fact that mobility out of the prominent firms in general (whether to an existing incumbent firm or to an entrepreneurial start-up) is significantly lower from mobility out of the less prominent firms. Connection of the mobility and entrepreneurship from prominent firms shows that both phenomenon of turnover and entrepreneurship should be looked in tandem in order for understanding why and how individuals choose entrepreneurship versus dependent employment as means of getting ahead (Sorensen and Fassiotto, 2011) . Being in the employ of a prominent firm lets individuals to advance in their careers, maximize their pecuniary benefits, and absorb the reputation and prestige of working for such firms. Such pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits of being in the employ of a prominent firm impede their departure to another incumbent. However, our analysis shows that if such departures from prominent firms take place it would more likely be to an entrepreneurial firm. In other words, employees of prominent firms are more likely to choose self employment to advance in their careers compared to joining another incumbent.
Especial structural position of prominent firms among other firms implies that they are endowed with superior routines, capabilities and knowledge regarding procedures and functional attributes of the industry. Therefore employees of prominent firms are naturally placed in an advantageous position to imbibe the superior routines and knowledge of the industry and exploit that to start their own business.
Our results, indeed, show that learning from prominent firms increases the likelihood of transition to entrepreneurship. This is in accordance with the existing theoretical arguments about knowledge inheritance and transition to entrepreneurship. Learning of routines and industry knowledge requires repeated exposure and time therefore we don't observe immediate departures from prominent firm to entrepreneurship. Departures to entrepreneurship increases with the interaction of employees' tenure and the prominence of their employer suggesting that the learning routines and knowledge is probably explaining why individuals leave prominent firm more often to start their own venture. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, especial structural position of prominent firms not only is the indicator of their superior routines and knowledge but it is also an indicator of their attractiveness to the labor market. Job candidates have preferences over firms and just as students rank universities for admission, job candidates also rank employers. We argued that prominence of a firm increases its attractiveness for prospective employees and therefore there should be an over-representation of high ability employees in prominent firms. Individuals with highest abilities are likely to be closer to their attainment ceiling and are likely to choose both employment in a prominent firm and entrepreneurship during their career history as means of closing the gap between the rewards and their abilities. Therefore transition to entrepreneurship from prominent firms would also be the result of the systematic sorting of high ability employees in prominent firms ex-ante. Our initial results shows that high ability employees are more likely to transition to entrepreneurship from prominent firms but such transition doesn't seem to be related to the sorting in the labor market. We were unable to find the over-presentation of high ability employees in prominent firms.
Nevertheless it should be noted that our analysis of sorting is possibly not fully revels the sorting of high ability employees in prominent firms and the results should interpreted with caution. Taken together our results corroborates with the influence argument that prominent firms add more value to their employees' knowledge about the industry and entrepreneurial opportunities.
In sum we reiterate that we started with a stylized fact in the employee entrepreneurship literature regarding the effect of firm prominence on transition to entrepreneurship. Our results suggests that prominence of the employer increases the likelihood of employees departing for entrepreneurship and that such departure is because of the superior learning environment of their prior employer not their innate abilities. 
